Abstract
Introduction
With the new trends of cloud computing and wireless networks, services have become the core of the current software architectures. In the Software as a Service software distribution model [1] , services allow users to access business functionality from wired and wireless networks without installation. Instead of investing for regularly upgrading hardware, users can utilize thin client such as mobile devices to access services from anywhere and at anytime. With this ability, services can provide flexibility and convenience for wireless network users. However, they also bring about security challenges, in particular authentication system to protect unauthorized access for services.
Existing authentication methods have become more and more vulnerable in wireless networks. Due to the characteristics of broadcasting signals into the air, communications in wireless networks are susceptible to eavesdropping and intercepting attacks. Therefore, replay attack and cryptanalysis attack risks on existing authentication methods such as OpenID [2] , Kerberos [3] are higher. Although there are proposed authentication methods for wireless networks in [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , flexibly achieving secure, efficient and scalable authentication for different requirements in wireless networks are not their major concerns. Efficient authentication methods in [4, 5, 7, 8] are not secure enough for sensitive services. In contrast, authentications using asymmetric cryptography in [6] consumes a lot of computational resource, which is not suitable for low profile mobile devices. Furthermore, large scale dynamic users and services in wireless network can cause scalability problem for these methods.
In large scale dynamic system, access control system such as RBAC [9] and PRBAC [10] utilizes groups of users and services to achieve scalability. While users and services are dynamic, user groups and service groups are assumed to be more stable. Grouping users and services into user groups and services can help to deal with scalability. Meanwhile, some services also require individual identities authentication for auditing. However, none of existing authentication mechanisms can support both individual and group authentication.
Furthermore, the authentication model should also be flexible to adapt different requirements of problems and device profiles in wireless networks. There is no existing authentication method to provide secure, efficient, flexible and scalable authentication for individual and group wireless network users and services.
In this paper, a model providing secure, efficient, flexible and scalable authentication for wireless network services is proposed. In the authentication model, users and services are grouped into user groups and service groups respectively. Based on a set of Journal of Convergence Information Technology Volume 5, Number 1, February 2010 relationship among users, services, user groups and service groups, the authentication model provide individual and group authentication for users and services. A realization is proposed to validate the authentication model. An analysis and a discussion show that the implementation can achieve security, efficiency, flexibility and scalability in authentication for both individual and group wireless network users and services. The rest of paper is organized as follows. Next section reviews related works. Section 3 describes the authentication model. A realization of the authentication is proposed in section 4. Section 5 analyses and discusses properties of the authentication realization and model. Section 6 ends the paper with conclusion and proposes further research.
Background
In this section, two techniques used to realize the authentication model are described. The first technique is the dynamic key cryptographic generation and the second is a hybrid key management in wireless networks. The dynamic key cryptography can help the authentication protocols of the authentication realization prevent cryptanalysis attacks and replay attacks. Mean while the group authentication keys are used to controlled and distributed by the group key management among group members.
Notations
At first, notations using in this paper are described. 
K is a shared cryptography key to secure communications between P and Q P believes X P may acts as X is true P received X P received a message containing X, P can read and repeat X P said X P at some time sent a message containing X P controls X P has jurisdiction over X fresh(X) X has not been sent before the current protocol run 〈X〉 P cannot read or recognize X (P does not have the key k to decrypt {X}k *P
Dynamic Key Generation Technique
Dynamic keys are one-time symmetric cryptographic keys. In dynamic key cryptography, each message is encrypted by only one dynamic key. Cryptographic keys are not reusable in dynamic key cryptography. Therefore, it minimizes cryptanalysis attack risks. The idea of dynamic key is similar to onetime pad [11] . However, instead of having key exchange before the encryption, dynamic key cryptography has off-line key generation scheme to generate sequence of dynamic keys at involved parties. A dynamic key sequence is a collection of dynamic key {DK 1 …DK n }. Each dynamic key in the sequence is used to encrypt a message. One dynamic key DK i is computed from the previous key DK i-1 and other materials using the dynamic key generation techniques so that compromising the previous key DK i-1 does not make the current dynamic key DK i
In [12] , a dynamic key generation technique is proposed. The analysis shows that dynamic key sequence created by the scheme can prevent replay attacks in authentication. The dynamic key generation scheme is divided into the following four steps as in Fig.1 
With n is the number of dynamic keys a sequence, assume n > m, the other dynamic keys are generated by using hash function h() with the replaced parameters as follows. ) ... (
The result is a dynamic key sequence {DK 1 ,...DK n } used to secure communications in authentication.
Hybrid Group Key Management
Hybrid group key management [13] is an efficient group key management for wireless networks. Group key management is a mechanism to secure group communications via multicast by symmetric keys. The hybrid group key management is a distributed group key management designed on the structure of wireless cellular networks. Its architecture is separated into twolevel structure: the fundamental wireless network level and logic structure level. In the fundamental wireless network level, the whole wireless network is separated into smaller local wireless cells. Each wireless cell is managed by a key server named CKS integrating with the based station of the wireless cell. The CKS locally handles group key operations for members in its wireless cell. There is a central key server named GKS on the top level to manage messages of CKSs. The structure is illustrated in Fig.2 . The logic structure level is also divided into two clusters: leader cluster and member cluster. Based on these two clusters, rekeying operations in group key management occurs independently in each layer. It localizes effects of rekeying for member joins and member leaves. The logic structure is illustrated in Fig.3 
The Proposed Authentication Model
There are n users, m services, x user groups and y service groups in the model. These users are grouped into the user groups while the services are grouped into the service groups. Notations for users, services, user groups and service groups are specified as follows:
• n users written as u 1 ,…, u n • m service written as s In the proposed model, a user group represents for a set of users sharing a set of privileges. User group concept has been introduced in operating systems [14] and RBAC authorization control [9] . User groups are usually derived from existing groups of users in reality such as groups of friends, employees of a company, students of a class, or members of a family. Users are also grouped by their roles in a system. Usually a role is directly referred to a privilege in the system. By joining into a group, users share permissions with other members in the same user group. In the model, a user group has its own privilege via a represented role. The privilege stands for permissions to access different services in the system. In other words, users are grouped by their authorities. A user group, denoted as UG, of k members, u . i1 , …,u ik , is specified as follows: 
Services in a group share the same security requirements. By being a member of a service group, a service agrees to grant permissions to members of authorized user groups to access. Therefore services are grouped by security requirements. It is possible that a service be a member of multiple service groups. Although these service groups have different security requirements, the service adapts the security requirement from the using service group in an authentication. The security requirement for a service having multiple service group memberships is the minimal security requirements from these service groups.
In reality, services are often grouped by existing application packages. In a simple example, a multimedia company provides multiple paid TV channels as services. Although they are classified into their categories such as music, movie, news, fashion, cartoon, adult, etc., the TV channel services are grouped by pre-paid packages. Each package is considered as a service group. When a user subscribes a package, he/she is able to access to channels in the package. Instead of controlling authorization and authentication for individual channels, the company manages its services via service groups.
The main idea of the proposed authentication model is to provide authentication for user groups and service groups. Unlike traditional authentication model working with individual users and services, the proposed authentication model connects users to user groups, services to service groups. Instead of using individual identities, users and services authenticate their group identities. Therefore, authentications are considered to be performed between user groups and service groups. Hence, the individual authentication problem becomes group authentication problem. The overview of the proposed authentication model is illustrated in Fig. 4 . To provide authentication for users and services, the proposed model uses a building block named authentication verification. The authentication verification is an extension of the authentication block in [15] . It performs the authentication by validating claimed identities in authentication requests. An authentication request is simply a service access request created by a user and sent to a service in the system. There are three main components in the authentication verification: a collection of relationships, a group manager and an authentication controller. The tasks of the authentication controller and the group manager rely on the collection of relationships. To perform authentication, these components realize the relationships for their tasks. In other words, the collection of relationships between entities and identities is the fundamental component to uphold the group manager and the authentication controller in the model. The structure of the authentication verification is illustrated in Fig.5 . 
The collection of relationship
The collection includes relationships between authentication entities and authentication identities in the authentication model. The authentication relationship between a user U and his/her individual identity is called user authentication relationship or UGA. Similarly, the authentication relationship An Individual and Group Authentication Model for Wireless Network Services Huy Hoang Ngo, Xianping Wu, Phu Dung Le, Bala Srinivasan between a service S and its individual identity is called service group authentication or SGA. Between user U and user group UG, there is a user group assignment denoted as UA. Correspondingly, the relationship between entity service S and identity service group SG named as service group assignment or SA. Between two identities UG and SG, there is a group authentication relationship GA. The collection of relationships between entities and identities is illustrated in Fig.6 . 
The Group Manager
The group manager is built from two relationships: user group assignment (UA) and service group assignment (SA). These relationships are involved by two different types of entities: user and service. Therefore, the group manager is divided into two subgroup manager components: user group manager and service group manager. The user group manager is a key management service to manage memberships of user groups. Beside UA, it also controls UGA relationship. The service group manager is a key management service to manage memberships of service groups. It handles both SA and SGA relationship.
The Authentication Controller
The authentication controller is the core component to verify authentication request from users and services in the model. Similar to single sign on authentication approaches, the authentication controller employs a special service, named as authentication service, to handle authentication process. Authentication Service (AS) is a specific service that is used to verify claimed identity of entities in requests. The authentication service AS is a trusted third party verifying request authentication from users and services in the model. The trusts are represented by sharing authentication keys between users and AS or between other services and AS.
In the proposed model, authentication identities verified by AS are group identities instead of individual identities. These claimed identities are either user groups or server groups. The authentication of a user group identity from a user is to identify whether user is a legit member of user group UG. The evidences of user group identities and service group identities are represented by shared group keys obtaining from the group manager. These group keys are used as authentication keys for user groups and service groups.
AS employs authentication protocols to verify authentication requests. Authentication protocols are cryptography protocols to communicate among entities and AS in authentications so that users and services can prove their claimed identities. By encrypting/decrypting challenges and authentication materials in messages of the protocols with authentication keys, users and services can create the trust on their group membership with AS.
The Authentication Architecture
The proposed authentication architecture is divided into two layers which are Key Management and Authentication. These two layers are derived from the group manager and the authentication controller in the proposed model. The group manager creates a transparent layer to provide operations related to group memberships and group authentication keys for users and services. In the architecture, each user u, a service s or the authentication service AS is integrated with two modules which are a key management module and an authentication module. The key management module updates group keys from the the group manager via the key management layer. The authentication modules use the group key obtained from the key management module to authenticate with authentication services via authentication layer.
An Authentication Realization of the Authentication Model
The hybrid group key management and the dynamic key cryptography are used to fulfill the group manager and the authentication controller in the model. These mechanisms are the key components to enhance the efficiency and security for the group manager and the authentication controller in the model in wireless network services. The realization is used to demonstrate the advantages of the proposed authentication model over the previous authentication methods in wireless networks. However, it is neither the only realization of the authentication model nor the compulsory mechanisms to use for any realization for this model.
The Realization for the Group Manager
The realization of the group manager controls users groups and service groups to support for group authentication. It requires a mechanism to manage two different types of groups efficiently. Beside the group membership change operations, there are also two extra operations to support operations in authentication controller. To realize the group manager of the authentication model, the hybrid group key management in wireless networks is utilized to achieve security and efficiency for managing membership change of user groups and service groups.
Beside three basic rekey operations in hybrid group key management (user join, user leave and user handoff), there are two extra rekey operations. The first rekey operation is periodical rekey. This rekey operation is independent from membership change. It is used to refresh authentication keys periodically. It is used to reduce cryptanalysis attack risks on authentication keys. The other rekey operation is postauthentication rekey. After an authentication, authentication keys of involved entities are updated. This feature can help to reduce both cryptanalysis attacks and replay attacks. These rekey operations enhanced the security for the distribution and of authentication keys among members of user groups and service groups.
The Realization for the Authentication Controller
In the authentication controller, the authentication service verifies the authentication requests. To verify authentication requests, the authentication controller uses authentication protocols to validate claimed identities in authentication requests. Similar to other entities, the authentication service also uses authentication library to verify authentication. To verify identities of user groups and service groups, authentication service is a member of all user groups and service groups by default so that it knows all the group keys of all user groups and service groups for authentication.
There are two authentication protocols: one is for group, the other for individual.
The Group Authentication Protocol
The group authentication protocol using dynamic keys is proposed to verify identities for users and services via authentication service. In the first step of the authentication protocol, a service s receives a direct access request from a user u. In the request, u claims that he/she is a member of a user group UG. Firstly, s verifies whether UG is allowed to access itself using authorization control integrating with s. After confirming that member of UG can access s via the permission with SG while s is a member of SG, s forwards the request to AS to ask for authentication. Finally, the main purpose of AS is to verify authentication of the user group identity UG of user u and service group identity SG of service s.
An Individual and
The authentication protocol consists of six following steps.
Step 1: u sends the request to s claiming that he is a member of UG. Beside the claimed user group identity, the message contains a nonce N u and a hash value of the nonce exclusive-or with the key group of UG, (h(N u Step 4: s decrypts its message from AS to extract EK and IK. It forwards the first part of the message, the key material for u, receiving from AS to u. The message sent to u also contains three temporary keys TK which are sent to as the material for s to generate dynamic keys. 1 , TK 2 and TK 3 as in step 2 to create dynamic keys. It also includes another nonce N s
'
Step 5: u extracts EK, IK and N to challenge u to encrypt it.
u from the first part of the message. The extracted value of N u is compare with the original value of nonce N u when it created. When the value is matched, u can trust two keys EK and IK created by AS. It uses EK to decrypt the second part of the message to extract temporary keys TK 1 The message flow of the group authentication protocol is described in Fig. 9 .
Figure 9. The group authentication protocol
The result of the authentication protocol is a secure channel established between u and s. The secure channel uses a sequence of dynamic keys as cryptographic keys for securing communications. During steps 5 and 6, both u and s start to share a sequence of dynamic keys DK 1 , DK 2 , etc... They use these dynamic keys to secure the communications between them.
The Individual Authentication Protocol
In the original idea of the authentication model, users utilize their user group identities to authenticate and access services. It accelerates authorization and the identity look-up in the authentication. Services and authentication service does not need to store memberships of all the users. Therefore, authorization verification process does not have to look up user memberships and its performance can be optimized. In the authentication model, services recognize access requests from members of user groups. The identity to be verified is group identity. However, some service requires individual identity authentication for audit tracing as well.
In the situation of services requiring individual identity authentication for audit tracing, the individual authentication protocol is proposed to authenticate both individual identity and group identity. This extension made the authentication to be similar to two-factor authentication from user group identity and user individual identity.
The individual authentication is somewhat different from the group authentication protocols. In message 1 and 2, the individual identity u is inserted. The individual dynamic keys 
Analysis and Discussion

Security Analysis
The security analysis is performed from each component to the whole authentication realization. Because the security of the group manager is described in [13] , we do not repeat the analysis of the group key management. The security analysis expresses that the group manager can distribute authentication keys securely to members of user groups and services group. The protocol authentication protocols are formally analyzed by SVO logic [16] . The following analysis is performed to verify the security of the authentication controller. Before analyzing the authentication controller, the freshness of the dynamic keys is verified so that they can be used to secure authentication protocols.
The Freshness of Dynamic Keys
In this analysis, dynamic keys are investigated to find out whether they are good keys for cryptography and authentication. The belief in the goodness of cryptographic keys are mentioned in [17] as a base to construct logic to verify authentication protocols. Beside the goodness, freshness of authentication keys are also mentioned as the authentication key has not been used before the current run of the authentication. The following theorem is used to explain the goodness and the freshness of dynamic keys from its dynamic key generation input.
Dynamic Key Theorem. If an entity P believes that two keys EK and IK are produced and sent by AS and it also believes in either the freshness of either initial keys EK, IK or temporary keys TK 1 , TK 2 and TK 3 , the produced dynamic keys DK 1 ,…,DK n are believed to be good and fresh keys to communicate with other entities in an authentication.
Proof: All entities in an authentication are assumed to believe that AS has a jurisdiction in EK and IK. In other words, they believe that AS generates good keys EK and IK. Therefore, it is deduced that P believes in the goodness of EK and IK.
P believes AS controls EK, IK ∧ P believes AS says EK, IK → P believes EK, IK
Because it is infeasible to guess dynamic keys and the collision freedom condition for the strong hash function f(.), the goodness of the first dynamic key DK 1 derived from equation (3) based on EK and IK can be deduced: P believes EK, IK → P believes DK 1 When the entity P believes in DK 1 , he/she also believes in the next dynamic key DK 2 derived from equation (3'). Therefore, the other dynamic keys in the sequence, DK 3 , DK 4 , …, DK n are also believed by P. The freshness of the first dynamic key DK 1 in the sequence is also deduced from the freshness of one of the initial keys EK, IK, TK 1 , TK 2 and TK 3 Similar to the work out of the goodness for other dynamic keys in the sequence, other dynamic keys DK is fresh. 2 , DK 3 ,…, DK n are also fresh when one of the initial keys IK, TK 1 , TK 2 or TK 3 is fresh.
Based on the dynamic key theorem, two following corollaries are given to prove the security of two authentication protocols with dynamic keys.
Corollary 1. Dynamic Key First Generator Corollary
P believes AS says (EK, IK) ∧ P believes fresh(TK
This corollary explains that after receiving EK and IK from AS, P can create TK 1 , TK 2 and TK 3 and exchange with Q to generate dynamic keys DK i to secure communication. P can believe in the goodness and the freshness of dynamic keys DK i in communicating with Q.
Corollary 2. Dynamic Key Second Generator Corollary
Q believes AS says (EK, IK) ∧ Q believes fresh(EK, IK)
This corollary explains that after receiving and verifying the freshness of EK and IK from AS, Q can use TK ),∀i>0. 1 and TK 2 receiving from P to generate dynamic keys DK i Both the two above corollaries are deduced from the dynamic key theorem. Based on these corollaries, the security of the authentication protocols is verified.
to communicate with P. Q can believe in the goodness and the freshness of dynamic keys in communicating with P.
Security Analysis of the Group Authentication Protocol
The proposed authentication protocol is analyzed by SVO logic [16] to find out whether it achieves authentication goals. Analysis in SVO uses twenty one axioms to interpret goals in cryptographic protocols.
The authentication protocol has a set of six goals for authentication: ping authentication, entity authentication, secret dynamic key establishment, dynamic key freshness, mutual understanding of dynamic keys and dynamic key confirmation. These six goals are specified as follows: 
P13. s believes fresh(TK )
3 )
P1 to P2 note that both u and s are assumed to believe in their group authentication keys. P3 and P4 note that they also believe in two key EK and IK generating by AS. P5 and P6 note that they believe in the freshness of the keys generated by AS. P7, P8, P9 and P10 note that they believe nonces generated by themselves. P11, P12, P13 note that s believes in the freshness of temporary TK 1 From the analysis above, we can derive authentication goals for u from the analysis above. For u, G1 is derived in (iii), G2 in (v), G3 and G4 in (iv) in G5, G6 in (v). Similar to this, we do the derivation for s.
)) by Saying Axiom, Source Association Axiom, Belief Axiom, P8, P29, and iv. Similar to the derivation for u, we can derive conclusion that the authentication for s meets its goals with the above analysis. For s, G1 and G2 are derived in (iv), G3 and G4 in (iii) in G5, G6 in (iv). )) by Saying Axiom, Source Association Axiom, Belief Axiom, P10, P25, and iii.
In summary, the authentication protocol meets six goals for both user and service. Based on the derivation for u and s, the six basic goals of authentication protocols in SVO are achieved.
Security Analysis of the Individual Authentication Protocol
Similar to the security analysis of the group authentication protocol, besides the original assumption from the group authentication, the individual authentication protocol has two extra assumptions expressing that both u and AS believe in the individual key DK i u of u. As we see, P42 is similar to P24; P43 to P25. The comprehensions of P40 to P41 are interpreted by P44 and P45 as follows:
Comprehension Assumptions
Interpretation Assumptions
P44. s believe s received ({EK}DK
The rest of the derivation is similar to the derivation of the group authentication protocol.
Performance Analysis
Because the key management layer is transparent to the authentication layer, the cost in an authentication does not involve the cost of group management. Thus, it is based on the cost of the authentication protocol in the authentication controller. The computational cost for u, s and AS in an authentication are summarized in Table 2 and Table 3 . This cost includes cost to generate dynamic keys, encrypt and decrypt messages in the protocol. The results in Table 2 and Table 3 show that the computational cost of individual authentication protocol performance is slightly higher than that of the group authentication protocol. 
Discussion
Traditional Security Risks
In this part, the authentication realization is examined under three traditional security risks for authentication: replay attacks, phishing attacks and cryptanalysis attacks. Because a dynamic key can be used once, a cryptographic message can only be decrypted and validated once. Therefore, authentication service can detect replay messages. Without the ability to generate the encrypted messages from correct synchronized dynamic keys, adversary cannot mount successfully replay attacks on cryptographic protocols using dynamic keys. Similarly, from a compromised dynamic key, it is infeasible to compute next dynamic keys for authentication. Therefore, the authentication protocol can reduce risks of phishing attacks and cryptanalysis attacks.
Scalability
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The authentication model can achieve scalability to adapt to rapid changes of the system. In wireless networks, users and services are very dynamic. Users and services may join and leave system very frequently. When the number of users and services change rapidly in the large scale system, the impact to management cost for authentication may become a considerable problem.
By grouping users and services into user groups and service groups, the authentication model can achieve scalability. Instead of dealing with each individual member of groups, the authentication is performed on group members. While the users and services are very dynamic in wireless networks, the user group and service group are more stable. Management Cost from rapid changes can be reduced with the proposed model.
Flexibility
The two layer architecture of the authentication model offers a great range of realizations for components in two different layers. Because of the separation and transparency between the two layers, each of them can be independently realized and implemented. A realization for the authentication controller in authentication layer does not restraint the realization for the group manager in key group layer and vice versa. Both the group manager and the authentication controller have many possible realizations and implementations.
The authentication model can be applied for not only wireless networks but also wired networks. With a great range of available realizations for both two components in two layers, realizations of model are able to offer different level of security and efficiency. There are efficient realizations that are suitable for large scaled wireless network users and services operating on limited resource devices. There are also strong secure realizations that can be used to protect sensitive services and users in wired networks.
Comparison
In order to validate the security and efficiency, the proposed authentication realization with two authentication protocol are compared to two existing authentication protocols: Kerberos and OpenId. Table 4 shows the security comparison of the proposed authentication realization with Kerberos and OpenID via replay attacks, cryptanalysis attacks and phishing attacks. The comparison shows that only proposed authentication is secure under replay attacks, cryptanalysis attacks and phishing attacks. By using dynamic keys, the proposed authentication realization is able to provide secure authentication for both individual and group of users. The comparison in the table 5 shows the efficiency of the proposed authentication realization in compare to other authentication methods. Although the proposed authentication realization is not the most efficient authentication method, the differences from the most efficient authentication method, Kerberos, are two symmetric encryptions. It shows that the proposed authentication realization can achieve high level of security without scarifying its performance.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed the security, efficiency, scalability and flexibility issues in authentication for wireless network services. There has been no existing authentication method that can achieve security, efficiency, scalability and flexibility. A new authentication model for wireless network services has then been proposed to tackle the problems. The authentication is made real by an authentication realization using dynamic key cryptography and hybrid group key management. The group and individual authentication are performed via two different authentication protocols. We have demonstrated and proved that the authentication realization can achieve security, efficiency, flexibility and scalability characteristics.
This research has opened up avenues for further works to secure wireless network services to prevent unauthorized access. In future work, the authentication
